Muslim immigrants in America come from almost every country in the world, but statistically most of them have immigrated from countries that continue to suffer under autocratic rule. As far as American mosques are concerned, this fact has two distinct outcomes: first, America’s Muslim immigrants have a general distrust of authoritative figures and therefore possess a hyper affinity for implementing the procedures of democracy but not necessarily its soul and spirit. Second, since most mosques in Third World Muslim countries are run by the government, mosque imams become government employees as a consequence. This perception of imams as employees lingers in the minds of many immigrants and it greatly affects their treatment of and interaction with American imams.
It is within this context that the foundations of governance in America’s mosques have been created. In previous essays, I discussed why the way mosques are formed in America is quite unique, compared to other faith groups. In the case of most mosques, a group of professionals band together to establish a mosque. They organize and mobilize, raise funds, and hire contractors. After the masjid construction is complete, the founders will either become permanent board members or organize elections and invite the members to elect their own board members. Either way, the new board soon realizes that delivering spiritual and educational services is quite a daunting task, one that requires the full-time commitment of an Imam, who is soon hired almost as an afterthought. If the Imam maintained a low profile and complied with the board's direction, he will survive. If the Imam is the aggressive type who comes with his own vision, over time the gap between the board and Imam widens, and the Imam will either step down or will be nudged out by the board.
A simple observation of the vast majority of America’s mosques will reveal immediately that the model in which the Imam is subordinate to the board has failed.
This is why:
First, the Imam considers himself a spiritual leader who’s on a mission to serve the community and bring it closer to God. He also sees himself as a man of the people, who works diligently with them on a daily basis and is financed by their donations and contributions. The Imam feels that ultimately he should be accountable to the people that pay his salary, not the board. On the other hand, the board assumes, and rightly so, that the Imam should be accountable to it since it is the employer and the Imam is the employee. Those two perspectives inevitably clash.
Second, the Imam’s job is highly complex and demanding and cannot simply be detailed in a “job description”. Most Imams are torn between their own priorities, community demands, and board expectations. More often, Imams are forced to dismiss their own priorities and community needs in order to acquiesce to board requests. While this compromise could work for a while, it is simply not sustainable in the long term, and conflict between the Imam and the board will eventually ensue.
Third, immigrant board members, despite having lived in America for years, are still culturally influenced by the authoritarian institutions under which they have lived for so long. So while they sincerely profess their commitment to democratic ideals, they tend to follow the procedures of the democratic process and not its spirit, and once in office many resort to autocratic methods. In other words, a democratically elected board more often than not turns into a board of dictators.
Fourth, in mosques with permanent board members, the Imam is likely to make enemies with one or more board members. What starts as a disagreement can potentially evolve into a full-fledged personal conflict. Since there is no process to remove a board member in such settings, and because the founders/permanent board members have a sense of entitlement as a result of the efforts they put into the mosque over the years, the Imam ultimately becomes the easy limb to amputate. On the other hand, the situation is not any less severe with elected boards. While faces change through the election process, new people come to the board, many of whom are inexperienced in community affairs and were elected simply because of their financial contribution or professional stature.
Most Imams are veteran activists and leaders who have been serving for years. They believe they possess both knowledge about and insight into what the community needs, what worked and what didn’t, etc. Unseasoned board members might come up with ideas that while sincere are either impractical or outright naive. While Imams will try their best to show the board that the implementation of such ideas will be an exercise in futility, the board ultimately reserves the final authority to either go through with it or not. If the Imam showed signs of lack of cooperation or frustration, he will appear to be defiant and insubordinate and the chasm of misunderstanding between him and the board will ultimately widen, and separation becomes inevitable.
Fifth, American mosque boards work diligently to serve the community with the best of intentions most of the time. The management structures they employ, however, are either inefficient at best, or destructive at worst. For example, many boards tend to create other positions alongside the Imam, such as executive director, youth coordinator, outreach coordinator, etc. The idea is that Imams need to focus on religious education, while others can pay close attention to logistics, administration, finances, etc. While the idea seems innocuous in theory, it's a management anathema. What ends up happening is that multiple hierarchies are created in the masjid, one that works closely with the Imam, mostly volunteers, and another that works with the executive director, usually part-time paid staff members, and a third that is supervised by the youth director, etc.
The area of overlap is huge between all these aspects of work at the masjid, and since all these hierarchies are supervised by an “entity”, i.e. the board, and not a “person”, they ultimately start competing for resources, coordinate less and less with each other, and conflict inevitably arises between these different hierarchies on the one hand, and between them and the board and the other. Since most boards are comprised of volunteers, no level of dedication on the part of any board member can provide the needed management attention to make this complex structure efficient.
Finally, the Imam is customarily the chief fundraising agent of the masjid. He speaks at the banquets, visits and meets with donors, builds relationships, and it's through his teachings in general that people are inspired to donate. On the other hand, its only the board that has the ultimate authority to approve budgets and decide how money is spent. Imams gradually feel a sense of frustration as a result of the discrepancy between the effort they put in raising the money and their ability to have a say in its expenditure. Quite often imams can’t even decide on spending zakah funds, hiring an assistant or financing small projects without board approval.
But this essay is not just about diagnosing a problem. I’m also interested in offering some insight into possible solutions.
Spiritual Entrepreneurship
What am I proposing? Two things: First, The undeniable reality is that the best Imams are leaving America’s mosques when the community needs them the most. Many of them leave their mosques to join another, and the same vicious cycle starts all over again. Others are venturing out to find their own institutions. Many Imams have created institutions that have become known publicly as “third spaces” in which they offer most masjid services without calling it a masjid. We’ve seen around the country these institutions sprouting out such as the Ta’leef Collective, Bayyinah Institute, Qalam Institute, al-Maghrib Institute, Make Space, Safa Center, Hikmah Institute, and our very own Tarbiya Institute.
In my humble judgment, I feel that the best thing Imams can do for the community, their families, and the deen is to find an independent institution that has a certain focus, such as education, youth work, or spiritual growth, away from existing mosques. In order to avoid initial overhead costs, such institutions don’t necessarily need a permanent physical location. Imams can “rent as they go.” The governing structure of such institutions should be simple. A small board, with the Imams as its chairman, and two or three members that are trusted and active, will have a clear contribution to the institution. No need for membership, elections, or complicated politics. Ultimately, the organization will grow, more volunteers will get involved and more families will get attached to its services. Over time, with more and more services being offered, the board can choose a location at which Jumaa and daily prayers are offered in order to satisfy a growing need in the community. You can call that “location” a masjid if you like, but it's only one project offered by the institution and not the other way around. The institution cannot be reduced to just another masjid.
This is a self-correcting process. On the one hand, only qualified Imams can establish something like this. On the other hand, the community will only support such institutions if their leaders have the spiritual fortitude, the leadership clout, the needed eloquence, and the proper management and mobilization skills to pull it off. Otherwise, it’ll simply wither away on its own, and no one will feel bad about it because, well, it's not a masjid! Imams, on the other hand, will do their best to be attentive to the needs of their prospective “clientele,” i.e. the community. They will work hard to offer the needed services the community demands since it's the primary source of their funding. I call this a successful model of spiritual entrepreneurship, in which Imams use their talents to serve their community and make a good living while doing it. They will likely feel an initial financial pinch, but it’ll be worth it over time.
Second, since the fact of the matter still stands, that most Imams would rather serve under the auspices of existing mosques, and the community would rather not abandon the mosques and move to the “third spaces” altogether, some solutions need to be presented in order to adjust the board model and bring viability to the mosques and create a working relationship between the board and the imam.
In that regard, I propose some simple adjustments to mosque by-laws. These adjustments will primarily empower the Imam to be two things: first, a voting member of the board and second, the chief executive officer of the mosque. This requires going through a few steps:
In mosques that lack an Imam or whose Imams stepped down, a search committee needs to be created in order to select the best Imam available. The offer needs to include a lucrative financial package that will guarantee hiring the best Imam and provide a sense of security for him and his family.
After selecting the Imam, the board will ask the Imam to join the community for one month during which the Imam will preach, give the khutba, conduct classes, work with the youth, etc. After that month the board will get the feedback of the community through a referendum. If the Imam gets over 75% approval, he’s then instated as an “adjunct” Imam for three years.
Within the three-year trial period, the Imam gets to know the community and the community gets to know him. After three years both Imam and the community need to decide whether they can have a working relationship. The adjunct Imam is then presented to the community for another referendum. If the Imam gets over 75% approval, he’s then instated as the permanent Imam of the mosque, a voting member of the board, and the chief executive officer.
Boards need to invest in training Imams so that they are qualified to lead the masjid executive structure. This could be achieved through classes and seminars at local community colleges in management, finances, public speaking, outreach, social work, counseling, etc.
Imams will be engaged in all board discussions and decisions and will carry only one vote like everyone else. If decisions must be made with regard to Imam’s financial compensation, then the imam will excuse himself and let the rest of the board decide.
Finally, if the board feels down the road that the Imam is not performing well and not fulfilling his duties, and would like to dismiss him, they need to call the members for a vote of confidence to decide on the imam’s future. If the imam gets less than 75% approval, he’s dismissed, and if he gets more than 75%, the board must dissolve itself, and a new board is elected.
Before I hear gasps of shock and disbelief at these propositions, allow me to explain why this logic is the way of the future:
We are not reinventing the wheel. This is how many faith communities manage their pastors and priests, especially in the US evangelical community. It's a model that was tried and has achieved great success.
Bringing the Imam on board gives him a stake in the organization and invests him in its wellbeing. For other board members, it's a temporary period of service, but for the Imam, it's his spiritual calling, his reputation, and the well-being of his family, so he’s likely to work harder to make this work. Within such a structure, it would be almost inconceivable for the Imam to accept another job just because he’s being offered a higher salary.
While members of the board will come and go, Imam will always be there, ensuring the stability of the mosque and its spiritual mission, and will guarantee the continuity of its vision that he helped shape.
Imam’s involvement at the board level makes him privy to the challenges of leadership, be they financial or administrative. This provides the Imam with a realistic perspective of and a deep insight into the inner workings of the mosque and the challenges it's facing. It will be compelling for the Imam to be part of the solution instead of the convenience of being in the opposition seat.
Imam’s survival will be dependent on the level of satisfaction of the community and not personal disagreements or conflicts with individual board members that have often led to Imam’s dismissal to the dismay of a community that loved and appreciated him.
Since Imam is but a member of the board with only one vote, he’ll have to devise ways to work within the system to effect change and be a voice for the board, as opposed to working away from the board and utilizing unbecoming methods to rally up the community against its leadership, which has lead to the destruction of many communities.
In all successful corporations, there is only one person that is accountable to the board and to whom all employees are accountable: the CEO. If Imams became the CEOs of their mosques and provided they are qualified and have the proper training, more harmony will be achieved through good communication between staff members and their leader, and through proper direction and planning. This doesn’t mean that Imams will be busy worrying about bathroom remodeling and a leaking roof. The right people will be hired to take care of such things and Imam’s job will just be supervising and leadership.
Every year, the Imam will work with his staff members to come up with an annual plan and a proposed budget. Once both are approved by the board, the Imam starts implementation. The board will follow up through seasonal meetings, or help in the execution as volunteers, but will not interfere. This way the Imam is given a full chance to show his mettle and will be held fully accountable before the community.
This sense of stability will empower American-born Muslims to consider Imam jobs so it's not just monopolized by immigrants. This can be a true shift in the inner workings of our Muslim community.
What are some of the pitfalls of these models and how could they be remedied? I plan to address that in another essay inshaa’ Allah.